Mind uploading and personal identity
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Abstract
This paper explores the question of whether mind uploading, if ever technologically possible, would maintain or destroy the personal identity of whoever experienced the uploading. It will be explained how the question could be answered in different ways depending on the criteria for the maintenance of personal identity that are assumed. There is no single answer, since personal identity would be considered as maintained or not depending on the accepted assumptions. However, for most of the philosophical conceptions about personal identity, this would not be maintained in a process of uploading. This means, therefore, that this process would be equivalent to the disappearance of the subject, that is, to his death, and only from very limited positions could the opposite be defended.
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